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Abstract 
People respond to social dilemmas more cooperatively following a group discussion. However, group 
discussion may not adequately account for group members’ enduring commitment to be 
cooperative. In this experiment, on face-to-face groups of 6, we examined whether optimal 
cooperation would be more likely when groups were required to reach a collective decision about a 
social dilemma than when the group was able to discuss the dilemma but not make a decision, or 
when the members did discuss the dilemma. Groups that made decisions showed significantly more 
cooperation than those that merely discussed or did not discuss. Group discussion was sufficient to 
increase cohesiveness and identification but these variables did not explain the effects on decisions. 
Individual cooperativeness persisted into a subsequent decision only if the previous deliberation had 
involved a group decision. This shows that making decisions, not just sharing preferences, is 
important for groups to promote social cooperation. 
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Throughout society individuals and groups are faced with a tension between decisions that 
favor an individually rational outcome versus a collectively rational outcome. Take for example the 
negotiations surrounding the Copenhagen climate change agreement. Despite global benefit in 
cutting national CO2 emissions it is potentially politically unpopular and economically damaging for 
individual countries do so unilaterally. This tension is conceptually similar to social dilemmas used in 
psychological research. In a social dilemma participants must decide between an individually and a 
collectively rational choice. If others cooperate, individual participants will always personally gain 
more if they choose the individually rational (non-cooperative) choice. However, on average all 
participants will gain more if all choose the collectively rational (cooperative) choice than if all 
choose to be non-cooperative (Dawes, 1980).  Dilemmas, such as the Copenhagen agreement, are 
often negotiated within groups (Messick, Moore, & Bazerman, 1997). It is often the case that many, 
if not all, people initially prioritize protecting their individual interests.   
The aim of this paper is explicitly to compare the cooperation rates in a 6 person prisoner’s 
dilemma game (PDG) following no group discussion, a group discussion that prohibits a group 
decision, or a group discussion that includes a group decision on the best way to choose in the 
dilemma. Participants are asked take part in two trials of the PDG, one immediately after the 
discussion manipulation and one approximately 15-20 minutes later when they are no longer sitting 
with their group. 
We will show that if new groups have some cooperative members, the requirement to reach 
a collective decision will lead other members to shift towards cooperation. Moreover, this increase 
in cooperativeness persists after the group has disbanded. That is, initially uncooperative group 
members may leave the group decision arena convinced to be cooperative. This is very important 
both for the understanding of responses to experimental social dilemmas and for understanding the 
dynamics underlying collective outcomes in situations such as the Copenhagen treaty.   
The Group Discussion Effect and Group Identity 
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A reliable phenomenon in social dilemma research is the group discussion effect. When 
individuals discuss a dilemma in a group they subsequently show greater levels of individual 
cooperative choice (Caldwell, 1976; Rapoport, 1974; van de Kragt et al., 1986). However, discussion 
does not always help a group (Sunwolf & Seibold, 1999). For example, groups that engage in free 
discussion about a problem may make a short cut to a decision without sufficient analysis (Maier, 
1970).  Groups members can fail to share vital information (Stasser, 1992), may have difficulty 
attending to task relevant information (Brenner, 1973), and may make decisions that follow majority 
opinion regardless of its wisdom (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). Consequently, in a social dilemma, if the 
majority prefer non-cooperative choices, free discussion may not enable cooperative advocates to 
share their preferences or they may simply be overruled even when mutual cooperation is the 
optimal solution to the dilemma. Frey (1995) suggested that to overcome these problems some form 
of moderating process must be imposed to facilitate group discussions. For example, a group 
member may be asked to act as a moderator, or the group could follow an imposed procedural rule 
about how to make its decision.   
Interestingly, Lewin (1947) showed that a group decision per se, as distinct from a discussion 
without a decision, may be important in promoting lasting opinion change.  Lewin (1947) was 
interested in encouraging housewives to increase the level of offal in their family’s diet. Families 
increased their offal intake when the house mother had been in a group that discussed and took a 
decision to eat more offal than when they had merely been exposed to a lecture espousing the 
virtues of eating more offal. This suggests that simply the requirement to make a decision about a 
social dilemma could be sufficient to increase cooperative (optimal) preferences by group members. 
Indeed, this precisely what was found by Hopthrow and Hulbert (2005).  
Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee, (1977) provided evidence that the group discussion effect 
maybe due to an increase in group identity brought about by a period of discussion. This increase 
would induce group members to be more concerned about the group’s outcome than they might 
otherwise have been. The group’s outcome is analogous to the cooperative choice (Komorita & 
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Parks, 1996). The lack of a referent group in the design used in this experiment may hinder the 
formation of group identity. However, we would expect a period of task related discussion to 
increase levels of cohesion. Higher cohesion should also promote more concern for the group 
outcomes and an increase in cooperative choice (cf. Hogg & Hardie, 1991).  Moreover, Hopthrow & 
Hulbert (2005) argued that discussion may cause increases in group identitiy and cohesion but these 
may not explain the observed increases in cooperation because they fail to take into account the 
effect of the consensus building process. Indeed Bouas and Komorita (1996) argue that it is a 
consensus building process that is necessary to promote increases in cooperation. We will measure 
group identity and cohesion to evaluate their impact on cooperation in this scenario. 
A Group Decision Effect and Group Norms 
Hopthrow and Hulbert (2005) proposed that the group discussion effect can be explained in 
terms of a group decision. If the group discussion effect arises because groups actually reach an 
explicit consensus, then the discussion effect should be eliminated when a group is prohibited from 
making an explicit decision. However, previous research has not systematically examined effects of 
discussion in the absence of decision (e.g., decisions could have been reached during discussions), 
therefore it is not known whether making a decision has a distinct effect over and above that of 
discussion.   
To examine this question this proposition the present experiment explicitly compares the 
impact of three different deliberation scenarios: when participants do not discuss the dilemma (No 
Discussion), when participants discuss but must not make any form of decision (Discussion Only), 
and when participants discuss and make an explicit group decision about the dilemma (Discussion 
and Decision).  If making a cooperative group decision is the actual basis for the group discussion 
effect, levels of subsequent individual cooperation should be higher in the Discussion and Decision 
scenario than the Discussion Only and No Discussion scenarios.  
Hopthrow and Hulbert (2005) found that, following discussion, a group decision to 
cooperate occurred even when only a minority of group members advocated the cooperative choice. 
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Thus, initially non-cooperative group members had changed from their initial position. The 
implication is that the orientation towards reaching a decision leads discussion group members to 
process the dilemma systematically (cf., De Vries, De Dreu, Gordijn, & Schuurman, 1996) which 
should result in more lasting opinion change. It follows that an explicit requirement to reach a group 
decision should promote more lasting opinion change. Group members that enter the group as non-
cooperators should leave the group as cooperators. This has important implications for persuading 
networks of people the utility of cooperation. To evaluate whether this happens, the present 
experiment examines participants’ preferences for cooperation before and after the group 
discussion/decision phase. 
An important function of a group decision is to initiate a norm of commitment. This norm 
could be external, for example, group members may stick with their commitment for fear of 
retribution. The norm could also be internal whereby group members stick with their commitment 
to avoid violating their own ‘personal standard of conduct’  (Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski, & Harris, 
1997, p.1301). Kerr et al. found that discussion of a social dilemma invokes participants’ internalized 
commitment norm. If this happens, it is likely that the commitment in past research could arise from 
an implicit or explicit group decision, following which participants would feel compelled to honor 
their commitment. If this is the case, we would expect the internal commitment norm would arise 
and persist more clearly following a group decision than following discussion only.  We would also 
expect commitment to persist not only when participants continue membership of their group and 
also when that group has been disbanded.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Two hundred and seventy psychology students participated in a prisoners’ dilemma game in 
face-to-face groups of 6 people.  The experiment used a 2 (Choice: Choice 1, Choice 2) x 3 
(Deliberation type: No Discussion vs. Discussion Only vs. Discussion and Decision) mixed design. 
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Deliberation type was a between participants factor. Participants were asked to make choices 
between J (cooperate) and P (don’t cooperate) in a prisoners’ dilemma game.  
Procedure and Materials 
Participants were randomly assigned to 6 person groups and asked to read along whilst 
listening to pre-recorded audio instructions. 
Table 1 shows the payoff matrix used. In the table, J is the label participants see for the 
cooperative choice and P refers to the non-cooperative choice. The matrix indicates the payoff a 
participant receives as a function of their choice (the rows) and the distribution of preferences in the 
group (the columns). As shown in Table 1, if a participant chooses not to cooperate (P) and all other 
members choose to cooperate (J) the participant will receive 400 points and other group members 
will receive 260 points. To check on pre-group opinions, participants’ initial personal preferences for 
J or P were recorded before any manipulations.  
Participants earned points from both Choices 1 and 2. Choice 1 was made after the 
deliberation manipulation. Choice 2 was made when all participants were no longer with other 
group members. Before being asked to make Choice 2 participants were told either that they were 
making the choice as part of the same group as before or as part of a different group than before.  
Data analyses indicated that this manipulation had no effect and did not interact with deliberation 
type. This will be discussed later. Participants were informed that their choices would be anonymous 
and any points that they earned would be converted into school supplies at the end of the 
experiment.  
In the No Discussion condition participants were given 5 minutes to write down all the 
reasons they could think of for selecting one choice or the other. They were asked to do this without 
communicating with other members of their group. In the Discussion Only condition participants 
were given 5 minutes to discuss as a group the best choice to make but they were asked to talk 
merely in terms of possibilities not to make a decision. In the Discussion and Decision condition 
participants were asked to discuss the best choice to make and make a group decision about how 
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they should behave. They were asked to indicate this decision which could be all-J (all-cooperate), 
all-P (all not-cooperate), or a mixed decision which was somewhere in between.   
Choice 1 
  After the deliberation manipulation, alone and without communicating with others, 
participants were asked to choose between cooperate vs not-cooperate options. They were 
informed that these choices would contribute to their points totals.  After making their choice 
participants were provided with anonymous feedback on their outcome. They were then asked to 
complete scales measuring their group identity, group cohesion and the level to which they trusted 
other members of their group.  
Group Identity 
Group identification was measured with 10-items, each measured on a 7 point scale (based 
on Abrams, 1998). Taking the mean of the 10 identity items and reverse coding 1 item created a 
measure of group identity, higher values indicate higher levels of group identity. Reliability analysis 
revealed a Cronbach’s α = 0.90.  
Group Cohesion 
Group cohesiveness was measured using 9-items, each measured on a 7 point scale 
developed from Hogg’s definition of Group Cohesiveness (e.g. Hogg & Hardie, 1991). A measure of 
group cohesion was created by taking the mean of the 9 cohesion items lower values indicated 
higher group cohesion, reliability analysis revealed a Cronbach’s α = 0.83.  
Trust 
Trust was measured with one item ‘I do not trust the other members of my group’ on a 7 
point scale from 1 ‘Totally Agree’ to 7 ‘Totally Disagree’. 
Choice 2 
 After the Choice 1 phase participants were separated from their groups and were given the 
points matrix again. They were asked to make a further choice. They were told that points earned 
from this choice would also be added to their points total and converted into school supplies. 
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Participants had not been informed beforehand that there would be a second choice. At the end of 
the study participants were debriefed and were given school supplies. 
Results 
Data were collected from forty five 6-person groups. Prior to the discussion manipulations 
there were no differences in individuals’ prior cooperation rates (M  = 0.46) between the three 
conditions F(2,267) = .19, p = .83, η2 = .001. Data were analyzed at the individual level to allow 
comparison between Choice 1 and Choice 2. The dependent variable was the proportion of 
cooperative choices for each group P(c).  
A 2 (Choice: 1, 2) x 3 (Deliberation type: No Discussion vs. Discussion Only vs. Discussion and 
Decision) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on P(c), with Choice as a repeated measure and 
Deliberation type as a between participants factor. Means within each condition are displayed in 
Figure 1. There was a significant main effect of Choice F(1,263) = 35.88, p < .01, η2 = .12. In line with 
expectations we found a significant main effect of Deliberation type F(2,263) = 19.67, p < .01, η2 = 
.13. These effects were qualified by a significant interaction between Choice and Deliberation type 
F(2,263) = 6.6, p < .01, η2 = .05. Simple effects analysis revealed a significant effect of Deliberation 
type within Choice 1, F(2,263) = 24.42, p < .01, η2 = .16 and within Choice 2, F(2,263) = 8.89, p < .01, 
η2 = .06.  
Consistent with our hypotheses and shown in Figure 1, paired comparisons on Choice 1 
indicated that participants in the Discussion Only condition were significantly more cooperative than 
participants in the No Discussion condition p < .01. In turn, participants in the Discussion and 
Decision condition were significantly more cooperative than those in the Discussion Only condition, 
p < .01, and the No Discussion condition, p < .01. 
On Choice 2, paired comparisons indicated that participants in the Discussion and Decision 
condition were significantly more cooperative than those that were in the Discussion Only condition, 
p < .01, and the No Discussion condition, p < .01. There was no significant difference in cooperation 
rates of participants in the No Discussion versus Discussion Only conditions, p = .94.  
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Group identity, group cohesion and trust were all significantly positively correlated with one 
another p < .01. A MANOVA on these 3 variables revealed a significant multivariate effect of 
Deliberation type F(2,528) = 5.7, p < .01, η2 = .06.  The univariate analyses revealed no significant 
effect of Deliberation type on Trust. However, there were significant effects on both Group Identity 
F(2,265) = 5.66, p < .01, η2 = .04, and Cohesion, F(2,265) = 17.82, p < .01, η2 = .12. 
Group Identity did not differ between the Discussion and Decision and the Discussion Only 
conditions, p = .62. However, group identity was higher in Discussion and Decision than in the No 
Discussion condition, p < .01 and higher in the Discussion Only than in the No Discussion condition, p 
< .01.  Group Cohesion was higher in the Discussion and Decision condition than in the Discussion 
Only p < .05, and than in the No Discussion p < .01 conditions. Cohesion was higher in the Discussion 
Only than in the No Discussion condition, p < .01. 
According to Dawes et al. (1977) the group discussion effect might be attributable to 
increased identity. Given that condition had an effect on group identity and cohesion, it seemed 
appropriate to investigate whether the effect of Deliberation type on cooperation was attributable 
to group identity or group cohesion. We conducted an ANCOVA on P(c), with choice as a repeated 
measure, Deliberation type as a between participants factor, and identity and cohesion as 
covariates. There were no significant effects of the covariates, and the Deliberation type by Choice 
interaction described previously remained significant. Therefore, there was no evidence that group 
identity or group cohesion independently predicted or mediated the effect of Deliberation type on 
cooperative choice.  
Discussion 
In this experiment we explicitly tested whether discussion alone, or a discussion with a 
group decision can be sufficient to produce the ‘group discussion effect’ in social dilemma research 
(Caldwell, 1976). We compared cooperation rates following no-discussion, discussion only, and 
discussion followed by a group decision. Bouas and Komorita (1996), and Orbell, van de Kragt, and 
Dawes (1988), suggested that the explanation for the group discussion effect lies in a consensus 
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building process that does not require a decision. The present experiment tested that assumption 
explicitly by prohibiting an explicit decision in the Discussion Only condition.  
In line with previous research, the Discussion Only condition showed significantly higher 
levels of cooperation than the No Discussion condition, on Choice 1. However, the Discussion and 
Decision condition resulted in significantly higher levels of cooperative choice than the Discussion 
Only condition. Indeed, we note that 14 of the 15 groups made a cooperative group decision even 
though individuals’ prior preferences indicated only a .46 proportion of cooperation. From these 
results we conclude that a group decision is important although not essential for increasing initial 
cooperative choice.  However, while something in the discussion process is sufficient to promote 
cooperativeness, the decision process elevates cooperativeness still further.   
Cohen, Wildschut, & Insko (2010), showed that the opportunity to develop a norm of trust is 
one mechanism explaining cooperation in communicating dyads.  We found no impact of trust in our 
analysis of covariance. However, it is likely that trust is more difficult to develop in the larger groups 
of this study in comparison to dyads in Cohen et al. (2010). We also found no impact of group 
identity or cohesion on choice making. These findings are consistent with our argument that it is an 
internalized norm (Kerr et al. 1997) that is driving the consensus process, as evidenced in the Choice 
2 data.  
The findings for Choice 2 point to a distinctive impact of group decision. Unlike participants 
in the No Discussion and Discussion Only conditions, participants in the Discussion and Decision 
condition remained more cooperative individually at Choice 2. They were also significantly more 
cooperative than participants in both the No Discussion and the Discussion Only conditions. This 
demonstrates that making a group decision is highly effective in leading individuals to be 
cooperative and, importantly, persuading them to remain so.  
Note that the effects of discussion and decision were not moderated by whether 
participants anticipated staying in the same group or not. Given that the effects of decision also 
persisted into Choice 2 these findings are consistent with the idea that decisions resulted in a true 
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shift in preference rather than mere compliance to an emergent group norm. This supports Kerr et 
al’s., (1997) view that an internalized commitment norm (rather than fear of censure or retribution) 
may be the mechanism ensuring that people remain cooperative after they have committed to do 
so.  Moreover, the present results show that this internalized commitment is stronger after a group 
decision than discussion only. 
In conclusion, making a group decision enhances the ability of a group to solve a prisoner’s 
dilemma.  A plausible interpretation is that when groups are required to reach a decision they treat a 
social dilemma as a problem solving task, whereas when they merely discuss they may treat it as an 
opinion or preference task. To the extent that a dilemma is treated as a solvable problem it seems 
that groups are more likely to reach an optimal solution and its members are more likely to adhere 
to it. 
This experiment has shown that the way a group deliberates about a social dilemma makes a 
significant difference to members’ subsequent cooperativeness. Groups that discuss to make a 
group decision are significantly more cooperative than groups that discuss without the opportunity 
to decide. In addition, this increase in cooperative behavior remains relatively stable, indicating that, 
unlike discussion alone, making a group decision changes participants’ opinions as to which is the 
correct choice. This finding suggests that requiring groups to discuss and then reach decisions, rather 
than merely discuss their views can be an effective means of generating a norm that facilitates 
optimal levels of cooperation. 
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Table 1: Payoff Matrix, J is a Cooperative Choice and P is a Non-cooperative Choice. 
 
 Number of J&P choices in the group 
You choose 0J/6P 1J/5P 2J/4P 3J/3P 4J/2P 5J/1P 6J/0P 
J no one 
chose J 
140 170 200 230 260 290 
P 200 240 280 320 360 400 no one 
chose P 
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